. Successful self-control in this model is then thought to depend on a modulation of these mOFC value representations via the lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC) [3, 6 ]. Here we directly tested three key predictions of this model in patients with lesions to the mOFC (n = 9) and matched controls (n = 19). First, we show that mOFC lesions disrupt choice-free valuation ratings. This finding provides causal evidence for a role of the mOFC in reward valuation and contrasts with the effects of lPFC disruption [6] . Second, we show that mOFC damage indeed decreases selfcontrol during intertemporal choice, replicating previous findings [10] . Third, extending these previous observations, we show that the effect of mOFC damage on intertemporal choice depends on the actual self-control demands of the task. Our findings thus provide causal evidence for a role of mOFC in reward valuation and are compatible with the idea that mOFC damage affects self-control specifically under conditions that might normally require a modulation of mOFC value representations, e.g., by the lPFC.
In Brief
Peters and D'Esposito report that damage to the medial orbitofrontal cortex is associated with specific impairments in self-control during intertemporal choice. Patients showed disrupted reward valuation and made more impulsive preference reversals during decision making. Findings are consistent with neuroimaging-based models of selfcontrol.
SUMMARY
Many decisions involve a trade-off between the temporal proximity of a reward and its magnitude. A range of clinical conditions are associated with poor self-control during such intertemporal choices, such that smaller rewards that are received sooner are preferred over larger rewards that are received later to a greater extent [1, 2] . According to a prominent neural model of self-control [3] [4] [5] [6] , subjective reward values are represented in the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) at the time of choice [7] [8] [9] . Successful self-control in this model is then thought to depend on a modulation of these mOFC value representations via the lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC) [3, 6 ]. Here we directly tested three key predictions of this model in patients with lesions to the mOFC (n = 9) and matched controls (n = 19). First, we show that mOFC lesions disrupt choice-free valuation ratings. This finding provides causal evidence for a role of the mOFC in reward valuation and contrasts with the effects of lPFC disruption [6] . Second, we show that mOFC damage indeed decreases selfcontrol during intertemporal choice, replicating previous findings [10] . Third, extending these previous observations, we show that the effect of mOFC damage on intertemporal choice depends on the actual self-control demands of the task. Our findings thus provide causal evidence for a role of mOFC in reward valuation and are compatible with the idea that mOFC damage affects self-control specifically under conditions that might normally require a modulation of mOFC value representations, e.g., by the lPFC.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The self-control model [3] [4] [5] [6] suggests a specific division of labor between the lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC) and medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC)/ventromedial PFC (see Figure S1 for a schematic overview). The mOFC is thought to represent option values during choice (''reward valuation''), whereas the lPFC is thought to modulate these value representations to enable successful self-control. A prominent task that is thought to require self-control is ''intertemporal choice,'' where participants choose between smaller-sooner (SS) rewards and larger-later (LL) rewards. The self-control model makes specific predictions about the effects of mOFC lesions on intertemporal choice that were not tested in previous lesion studies [10, 11] (see Figure S1 ). First, because the mOFC (but not lPFC) is thought to be involved in reward valuation [8, 9] , choice-free valuation ratings should be disrupted following mOFC damage. Such ratings are unaffected by lPFC disruption [6] . Second, impaired reward valuation would then also disrupt the ability of lPFC to exert control over behavior through a modulation of mOFC value representations [3] . The latter effect should be most pronounced (1) under conditions of high temptation (for example, when SS rewards are available now as opposed to not now [6] ), and (2) in trials where SS and LL rewards are close in value. That is, if the unmodulated LL value is already larger than the SS value, self-control is not required [3] .
We tested these predictions in nine patients with mOFC lesions either due to traumatic brain injury (n = 7) or tumor resection (n = 2) (lesion laterality bilateral/left/right 5/3/1; average lesion volume 68.40 cc; see Figure 1 for a lesion density map of the patient group; see Table S1 for detailed clinical information). Patients were compared to 19 matched control subjects (see Table S2 for sample demographics and group comparisons). We report data from an intertemporal choice task and a reward attractiveness rating task for delayed rewards without choice that was modeled after a previous study [6] . Participants completed a few additional tasks not reported here (see the Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
As outlined above, because the self-control model predicts increased impulsivity only when self-control demands are high (see Figure S1 ), we predicted that patients with mOFC lesions should be relatively more impulsive in now versus not now trials. Such dynamic inconsistency is also predicted by hyperbolic discounting [12] : under hyperbolic discounting, a decision maker may choose $15 in 40 days over $10 in 30 days (in the not now condition), but also choose $10 available immediately over $15 in 10 days (in the now condition), even though the delay between the SS and LL reward is 10 days in both cases. Situations where the LL reward is chosen in not now and the SS reward is chosen in now are ''impulsive preference reversals'' (as opposed to the reverse, ''future-oriented reversals''; note that we use this terminology rather than the more commonly used term ''patient reversals'' to avoid confusion with the mOFC patient group).
However, as in a previous study using a similar paradigm [13] , there was no evidence for such impulsive preference reversals in controls-they made the same choice in now and not now trials most of the time ($90% of trials; see Table 1 ) and, when their choices differed, impulsive and future-oriented reversals occurred with a similar frequency (47% versus 53% of all reversals; binomial test: p = 0.397). mOFC patients also made the same choice in both conditions most of the time ($87% of trials). However, in stark contrast to the controls, they were more than twice as likely to make impulsive reversals (68% versus 32% of all reversals; binomial test: p = 0.000081), such that the overall proportions of the three trial types (no reversal/impulsive reversal/future-oriented reversal) differed significantly between groups (X 2 = 22.275, p = 0.000015). Interestingly, five patients (bilateral/unilateral lesion 4/1) predominantly drove this effect (see Table S3 for single-subject data), suggesting that bilateral lesions might cause more severe impairments. In contrast, no control subject showed an individually significant difference in reversal proportions (see Table S4 ).
We also characterized intertemporal choice in now and not now using the area under the curve (AUC) of the empirical discount functions (a model-free summary measure of intertemporal choice behavior [14] ; smaller AUC values indicate increased preference for SS over LL rewards; see the Supplemental Experimental Procedures). For group comparisons, we applied a bootstrapping approach appropriate for small samples [15] (see the Supplemental Experimental Procedures), which revealed that AUC now was significantly reduced in the patients (Figures 2A and 2C , p = 0.033; Figure S2A ). This was not the case for AUC notnow (Figures 2A and 2C , p = 0.14; Figure S2B ), and AUC notnow À AUC now was significantly increased in patients versus controls ( Figure 2D , p = 0.039; Figure S2C ). Taken together, both preference reversals and AUC analyses therefore confirmed the first prediction of self-control: the effect of mOFC damage on intertemporal choice was predominantly observed in now trials. Self-control also predicts that increased SS choices in now should occur mostly in trials where SS and LL values are relatively close. This is exactly what we observed ( Figure S2D ): the group difference in SS choices in now was most pronounced for intermediate LL reward magnitudes.
However, in contrast to the effects of lPFC disruption [6] , mOFC damage additionally affected reward valuation ratings when no choice was required. Subjects rated the attractiveness of all combinations of three reward magnitudes ($10, $15, and $40) and four delays (0, 8, 20, and 60 days) on a visual analogue scale (see Figures 3A and 3B for group average ratings and Supplemental Experimental Procedures for details on the task). Magnitude sensitivity (i.e., the slope of the relationship between Tables S3  and S4. ratings and reward magnitude) was significantly reduced in the patients ( Figure 3C , p = 0.013; Figure S3A ), whereas delay sensitivity ( Figure S3B ) and valuation of immediate versus delayed rewards ( Figure S3C) were not significantly different. Across subjects, magnitude sensitivity correlated with AUC ( Figures S3D  and S3E ). In the patients, individual differences in the degree of mOFC damage [16] were associated with the degree of behavioral impairments ( Figures S4A-S4C ).
We also fit the individual-subject choice data with four models of intertemporal choice (see the Supplemental Experimental Procedures for details): standard hyperbolic discounting with a single discount rate [12] , as-soon-as-possible (ASAP) discounting with separate discount rates for now and not now [13] , the common-aspect-attenuation model, which assumes that the influence of the delay common to both options is attenuated according to a weighting parameter w [17] , and intertemporal choice heuristics (ITCH), a recently proposed heuristic model [18] . Model comparison revealed a similar model ranking in both groups ( Figures S4D and S4E) , with ITCH outperforming the discounting models in both groups. Furthermore, the degree to which choice data were better accounted for by ITCH compared to ASAP was associated with shorter reaction times and greater overall AUC (Figures S4F and S4G) .
Taken together, these data indicate that, in contrast to disruption of lPFC function [6] , mOFC damage reduced the magnitude sensitivity of choice-free valuation ratings for delayed rewards. This provides causal evidence for a role of this region in reward valuation. Decision-making impairments following mOFC damage, on the other hand, resembled those observed after transient disruption of lPFC function [6] . mOFC patients were relatively more impatient in now versus not now, such that impulsive preference reversals were significantly increased in patients versus controls. These data are compatible with a central role for mOFC-lPFC interactions in self-control, such that disruption of either region causes similar decision-making impairments. The ability of the lPFC (which was intact in the patient group) to regulate behavior under conditions of high temptation might thus depend on the integrity of mOFC value representations. These findings confirm key predictions of a prominent neural model of self-control [3, 6] and most likely contribute to increased impulsive behavior following mOFC pathology [19] . 
